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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RULON R. WEST, 
Plaintiff and Appella;nt~ 
vs. 
TERRY R. WEST and FLORA E. ) 
WEST, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
10251 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEAR-
ING AND SUPPORTING BRIEF 
Appeal From the Judgment of the Third District Court 
For Salt Lake County 
Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Rulon R. West, plaintiff and appellant, respect-
fully petitions the court for a rehearing on the following 
grounds: 
1. The opinion of the court was based upon a mis-
1 
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taken assumption that the trial court had found that 
plaintiff made a gift to the defendants on April2, 1960. 
2. The issue of whether a gift was made by the 
suppelmental agreement of April 2, 1960, was decided 
on the prior appeal and was not tried in the court below. 
SUPPOR'.fiNG BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE OPINION OF 'fHE COURT WAS 
BASED UPON A MISTAKEN ASSUMPTION 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD FOUND 
THAT PLAIN'I'IFF lVIADE A GIFT TO THE 
DEFENDANTS ON APRIL 2, 1960. 
In its opinion this court proceeded on the assump-
tion that the trial court had found a gift on April 2, 
1960, saying: 
'' * * * there is a reasonable basis in the evi-
dence upon which the trial court could fairly 
regard it as constituting the required clear .and 
convincing proof that Rulon West had given 
401o of the entire enterprise, including his capital 
contributions, to his son, Terry, and 20Cfo there-
of to his wife, Flora, at the time of dissolution.}} 
(Emphasis added.) 
The trial court, however, did not so find. What it did 
find (if all of the findings are considered) was that in 
the original articles of partnership Rulon R. West 
2 
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agreed to contribute capital to the enterprise with the 
understanding that each contribution would be a gift 
to the partnership and that on dissolution such con-
tributed capital would be distributed on the 40-40-20 
basis. This agreement, insofar as it was executory, 
was unenforceable for lack of consideration, and the 
trial court found that on December 3, 1958, Rulon sent 
a letter to Terry renouncing an intention to "give" 
any more money to the partnr~rship. The trial court 
implicitly found that on and after December 3, 1958, 
the donative intention did not exist. There is ample 
evidence to support that finding. 
The original "Minute Entry of Decision" of the 
trial court (R. 59) does not once mention a gift; its 
lead sentence is, "The Articles of Partnership are 
binding upon the parties." Its second sentence refers 
to the intentions of the parties in the articles~ and the 
court goes on to find: 
"T4~ following items were not contributed for 
capital credit and an eventual possible 40-40-20 
distribution: 
(a) All contributions of Rulon R. West on 
and after the date of December 3, 1958, includ-
ing the $2,000.00 check dated February 26, 
1960, and the $350.00 check of March 21, 1960." 
The first mention of gift occurs in findings pre-
pared by the defendants and respondents on their coun-
sel's stationery, and even they do not find a gift on 
April 2, 1960. After reciting in Paragraph 5 that all 
amounts paid in to and including December 2, 1958, 
3 
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were contributions to capital, the formal findings go 
on to find (R. 69) that: 
"The several payments totaling $29,645.39 
paid into the partnership by Rulon on and after 
pecember ~' 1~58, were n?t intended to be paid 
In as contributions to capital, and were not in-
tended to be distributed to partners in the pro-
portion 40-40-20 upon dissolution as hereinafter 
set forth.'' 
The only finding 'vith respect to a gift was in para-
graph 10 (R. 70-71) which reads as follows: 
"That the parties and particularly plaintiff, 
R,ulon~ and defendant~ Terry~ intended and un-
derstood that the effect of the agreements where-
by Terry and Flora would receive, upon disso-
lution, forty ( 40) percent and twenty ( 20) per-
cent respectively of the amounts paid into capital 
by Rulon as finally adjusted and determined 
herein, 'Was that such receipt was by way of gift 
from Rulon to Terry and Flora." 
In his brief to the court on this appeal, appellant 
pointed out at page 20 that: 
"The court refused to find that the 'Supple-
mental Agreement' (Exhibit 16) (found by this 
court insufficient to constitute a gift) had opera-
tive effect, taking the position that it was un· 
enforceable for lack of consideration. The express 
negative finding is not inclu~ed .i~ ~he formal 
findings of fact, but may be Implicit In the fact 
that it is not mentioned in Conclusion of Law 
No. 1." 
This statement of fact in appellant's brief was not 
controverted by respondents-as this court's rules re-
4 
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quire it to be in event of disagreement-and it may be 
assumed that respondents had no objection to the state-
ment. 
Inastnuch as the findings of fact and conclusions 
of la'v 'vere prepared by respondents' experienced and 
learned counsel, one would think there would have been 
an express finding of gift on April 2, 1960, if this had 
been what either trial court or counsel had in mind. 
But there was no such finding. Even the respondents 
have not taken the position that the gift had been made 
by the supplemental agreement of April 2, 1960. The 
following is quoted from page 20 of the respondents' 
brief to this court : 
"The court did not award by way of gift. Let 
us be clear on this. The court said Rulon and 
Terry '"intended and understood that the effect 
of the agreements~ was that Terry and Flora re-
ceived by way of gift. This distinction is real and 
not technical. This is an entirely different matter 
than the court making its award on the theory 
of gift. 
While the parties clearly intended and be-
lieved that a gift had been made it is completely 
academic in the affirmance of the judgment 
whether a g!.ft was made or not. The judgment 
does not rise or fall on gift. The total import 
of the findings, conclusions and judgment is that 
the parties agreed that Rulon was to put up 
capital, Terry was to change his life's course 
and operate the venture, that the losses were to 
be proportionately taken and borne by the 
parties, the parties were to receive interest on 
5 
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the invested capital, and upon dissolution net 
assets or capital was to be distributed i~ the 
proportions herein repeatedly stated. These in-
tentions were expressly written in the articles 
and in the dissolution agreement as amplified b; 
the supplemental agreement . 
. This .r~sult is a re~ult of rights and obliga-
tions a~Is~ng from basic contra~t law. Ambiguity 
was originally thought by this court to obtain 
in regard to whether Rulon's money was loan 
or capital. That ambiguity has been removed by 
a scholarly and arduous search on the part of 
the trial court. 
Evidence of tax talk and of g.ift talk by the 
parties has here been adduced by the writer to 
show the basic contract intent~ not to show gift 
intent per se, although it is clear that a gift had 
in fact been made as a result of the operation 
of all agreements. Rulon agreed to file a return 
to implement this concept." (Emphasis added.) 
The trial court found that the amounts paid into 
the partnership by Rulon R. West prior to his letter 
of December 3, 1958, were meant to be gifts to the 
partnership, but the amounts paid into the partner-
ship on and after December 3, 1958, were meant to be 
repaid, whether classified as "loans" or something else. 
This court erred in construing the findings of fact to 
mean that Rulon had made a gift on April 2, 1960, by 
the terms of the supplemental agreement. 
Even if it is assumed that the evidence would 
justify such a finding, the evidence does not require it. 
Inasmuch as the supposed finding was not in fact 
6 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
made, the findings are perfectly consistent, one with 
the other. Their theory was that an intention to make 
a gift existed at the time the original partnership was 
entered into and that it was presumed to continue 
until Rulon renounced that intention. 
Whether the court made its finding with respect 
to the supplemental agreement makes all the difference 
in the world to this case. 'fhis court, in analyzing the 
findings, held that the trial court's finding of a gift on 
April 2, 1960, was inconsistent with the finding that 
the contributions made after December 3, 1958, were 
intended to be returned : 
"The making of the gift at the time the dis-
solution being established, no matter what plain-
tiff may have done or said prior to that time in-
consistent with the theory for gift, and no matter 
how completely or absolutely he had retained 
ownership or control of the property prior to 
that time, would make no difference. Inasmuch 
as he clearly indicated his intent to make the 
proportionate gifts to the defendants of the entire 
enterprise after that date and stated no exception 
or limitation in doing so, we can see no basis 
upon which to sustain the finding which excepts 
those advancements from the judgment." 
II 
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER A GIFT WAS 
MADE BY THE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREE-
1\iENT OF APRIL 2, 1960, WAS DECIDED ON 
7 
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THE PRIOR APPEAL AND WAS N 0 'l' 
'l.,RIED IN THE COURT BELOW. 
When this case was here before the question of 
gift was argued in the brief and ruled upon by the 
court. At page 15 of appellant's brief in the first case 
(No. 9870) it was pointed out that if the defendants 
were relying upon the agreement of April 2, 1960, the 
appellant would be prepared to show that there was 
undue influence in obtaining the gift, the influence aris-
ing out of the fact that great pressure was put on a 
susceptible Rulon West when Rulon was concerned 
about an imminent departure for South America. The 
need for such evidence appeared to vanish when this 
court handed down its opinion, for the court had the 
following to say about the supplemental agreement of 
April 2, 1960: 
"A careful perusal of this latter instrument 
will show that it does not indicate clearly a dona-
tive intent as it must do to make a gift. It simply 
purports to be an acknowledgment that the in-
terests that Terry R. West and Flora E. 'Vest 
had theretofore acquired were by gift. It is not 
any more definitive as to what those intere~ts 
were in relation to partnership 'assets to be dis-
tributed' in event of dissolution than were the 
other documents." 
Having disposed of that document, the court went 
on to analyze the meaning of the partnership articles 
and the dissolution agreement and sent the case back 
to the trial court to take evidence as to the intent of 
the parties in executing them. Thereafter the parties 
8 
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proceeded as if the supplemental agreement of April 
2, 1960, was not an operative agreement, certainly not 
a deed of gift. The subsequent pre-trial order provided 
that the primary issues to be tried were the meanings 
of the contracts entered into by the parties. The whole 
tenor of the pre-trial order and amendment to it so 
indicate, and the parties did not in fact litigate the 
question of whether the supplemental agreement was 
a gift. 
If the decision as handed down by this court is 
allowed to stand, the plaintiff will have been deprived 
of the opportunity to try the question of the validity 
of a gift on April 2, 1960-largely because of reliance 
on this court's statements in the prior opinion. That 
the plaintiff regarded the question of gift as being out 
of the case is apparent in excerpts from proceedings 
at the trial. The following appears at page 254 of the 
record: 
"MR. ROE: The plaintiff rests. 
In connection with the defendant's case for 
yesterday, there is one statement I would like 
to make for the record. In reading the deposition 
of Ruth West Francis reference was made to 
the statement made by the plaintiff with respect 
to the gift to Terry and Flora on about April 2. 
I did not object to this testimony because it 
does relate to some of the issues as to the con-
struction of the other agreements. However, I 
want to state for the record I do not consent, 
either expressly or impliedly, to including as 
an issue in this case, whether a gift was 1nade 
on April 2, 1960. 
9 
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I think that has been resolved by a decision 
of the Supreme Court, by the concessions made 
in Chambers by the defendant on Monday and 
by the opening statement of Mr. Rannow. ' 
I just want to make the record clear I do not 
consent to trying that issue. 
MR. RONNOW: The issue of that gift was 
made on April 21 
MR. ROE: Yes. 
MR. RONNOW: You do not repudiate the 
theory the gift was implicit in the lawsuit? You 
have some gift questions at some other times. 
MR. ROE: I am making my objection and 
my statement with respect to the operative effect 
of that supplemental agreement of April 2, 
1960. 
MR. RONNOW: I understand." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Again, at page 291 of the record, objection was made: 
"Q. I now hand you what has been marked as 
proposed exhibit 16, which is an original type-
written document bearing two signatures, and 
ask you what that document is? 
A. It is a Supplemental Agreement to the Dis-
solution Agreement signed April 2, 1960. * * * 
MR. RONNO,,T: I offer 16. 
1\tiR. ROE: I object to 16 on the ground, your 
Honor, first it purports to be supplemental to 
a Dissolution Agreement which was never finally 
executed by the parties, and, second that insofar 
as it purpo"rts to be a gift, it is outside. the !~sues 
of this case, and already been determined. 
10 
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A similar objection was made to testimony of E. L. 
Schoenhals (R. 337). 
Even Terry West did not take the position that 
the supplemental agreement was an operative document 
(R. 292): 
"Q. State, briefly, what in your mind gave rise 
to the need of amplification. 
A. Well, as I read the dissolution agreement, 
in my attorney's office this morning-well, I read 
it the day before, but as of the morning we went 
out to Murray, I read it, the question come to my 
mind, 'as of today' I receive 40<fo of what we 
sell that business for, whatever the net assets of 
the business are, as of that day. I am liable to 
give half of it back to Uncle Sam.' 
Q. Explain that. What do you mean by give 
half to Uncle Sam? 
A. I knew this would have to be shown as ordi-
nary income, or gain upon sale of the business. 
I knew that. 
I didn't know the amount, but I felt the 
greater portion would be paid as income taxes, 
to ordinary income or capital gains tax. * * * 
What I was co~cerned with, the Internal Reve-
nue would consider it income. That is what 
led me to have my attorney, Ed Schoenhals, draw 
up the supplemental agreement to show that 
this was a gift~ tax free.~~ (Emphasis added.) 
Terry's understanding as to the effect and purpose 
of the supplemental agreement was confirmed by the 
testimony of E. L. Schoenhals ( R. 342) : 
11 
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" * * * Mr. Wunderli wanted to have this 
exhibit No. 2 signed before Rulon left. Rulon 
did not want to sign it until he understood that 
Terry was going to take some action to get him 
out of there, and get his money for him-40/c 
of what he had put in this, he wanted back, and 
Mr. Wunderli wanted this signed, and I told 
Mr. Wunderli that along with this-so there 
wouldn't be any question about it, this other 
agreement should be signed, in which Mr. West 
would agree to file a gift tax return. 
Mr. Wunderli made no objection to that, and 
told me to go ahead on it * * * The thing I was 
involved in, and the thing I had been requested 
to do, was to arrange this matter, to give assur-
ance that Rulon West would give a gift tax 
return in connection with this matter. 
Q. Your primary concern at that time was to 
get Rulon to sign the supplemental agreement? 
A. My primary concern was to make sure 
Rulon understood that Ru-lon was going to file 
a gift tax return in connection with this matter." 
(Emphasis added.) 
As pointed out above, even respondents tried and 
argued this case as if the issue being tried was the ques-
tion of interpretation of other contract documents, and 
the effect of the supplemental agreement on them: 
"Evidence of tax talk and gift talk by the par-
ties has here been adduced by the writer to show 
the basic contract intent, not to show gift intent 
per se. * * *" (Respondents' brief Page 21). 
It would be a denial of due process of law (under 
both the Utah and United States Constitutions) for 
12 
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this court to enter a finding with respect to an Issue 
that was not litigated in the trial court. cf. U. S. v. 
Ahtanum lrr. Dist. (D.C. Wash., 1954) 124 F. Supp. 
818. 
Under the provisions of Rule 15 (b) Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, amendment to pleadings are freely 
allowed. But the rule contemplates that when evidence 
is offered at the trial which is objected to as being out-
side the issues, something should be done to expand 
the issues. The rule contemplates that if the pleadings 
or pre-trial order are amended to include additional 
issues, the other party, if he would be prejudiced by it, 
is entitled to a continuance. This court has held that 
the rule does not permit the entry of a finding on an 
issue was actually tried. As Justice Crockett said in 
National Farmer~s Union Property & Ca8ualty Co v. 
Thompson~ 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P .2d 249: 
"Plaintiff urges that inasmuch as the evidence 
of value just referred to was voluntarily intro-
duced by defendant, the court could pass on the 
issue, citing Rule 15 (b) to the effect that, 
though an issue is not raised by the pleadings, 
liberal amendment should be allowed 'even after 
judgment'; and further that the judge could 
modify the judgment as he did, under the author-
ity of Rule 54 (c) : 
' * * * Every final judgment shall grant 
the relief to which party in whose favor it 
is rendered is entitled, even if the party has 
not demanded such relief in his pleadings.' 
Notwithstanding all of our efforts to eliminate 
technicalities and liberalize procedure, we must 
13 
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not lose sight of the cardinal principal that under 
our system of justice, if an issue is to be tried 
and a party~s rights concluded with respect there .. 
to~ he must have notice thereof and an opportu-
nity to meet it. This is recognized in Rule 15 (b) 
which recites that such liberal amendment shalJ 
be allowed· if the issue is tried 'by express or 
implied consent of the parties.' It does not ap-
pear that there was any such consent to try the 
issue of the value of. this building." (Emphasis 
added.) 
If respondents' counsel genuinely intended that 
the supplemental agreement of April 2, 1960, consti-
tuted a gif~, he had an obligation to say something about 
it when objection was made to that line of questioning. 
The comments he actually made show an acquiescence 
in the view that this was not an issue in the case. His 
brief takes the same view; and appellant did not con-
sent, expressly or impliedly to try the issue. Had it 
been added as an issue appellant would have been en-
titled to a continuance to obtain testimony relating the 
reality of Rulon's consent. 
CONCLUSION 
If the court's decision remains as written, respond-
ents will have been allowed to profit by an apparent 
inconsistency they created themselves in preparing 
findings of fact for the court, and to recover on a theory 
that they themselves had abandoned. 
Had plaintiff been put on notice that the issue of 
"gift by supplemental agree1nent" was being tried, the 
14 
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case could have been presented in a different way. 
Evidence might have been presented as to the suscepti-
bility of Rulon West to suggestions of learned and 
experienced counsel in E. L. Schoenhals, and as to 
the pressure placed upon him at the Murray meeting. 
Earl M. Wunderli-who represented plaintiff-would 
have been asked to return to Utah from his home in 
New York to testify about the purpose of the supple-
mental agreement as explained to him by Mr. Scho-
enhals. 
But even if the court finds that the matter was 
"tried", there is a more serious objection to the decision: 
This court has taken over the role of fact finder ; created 
an inconsistency in the findings of fact; and rejected 
a consequent inconsistent finding. 
The findings must be read as a whole; so read they 
make it clear that the trial court found the "gifts" to 
have been made pro tanto as sums of money were paid 
into the partnership; and that the requisite intention 
was no longer there after Rulon West's letter of De-
cember 3, 1958. So construed, there is no inconsistency. 
If, as pointed out by the court in its opinion, "find-
ings which are at variance with the claims of both par-
ties" should be "closely scrutinized," an opinion of an 
appellate court similarly at variance should be similarly 
scrutinized. And the court's opinion here rejects not 
only the positions of all parties, but that of a trial judge 
as well. 
The case should be reheard and reconsidered, and 
15 
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the question of the validity of the gifts to the partner-
ship prior to December 3, 1958, decided on the basis 
of authorities cited in appellant's prior briefs. 
That portion of the decision denying the credit 
to Rulon of $29,645.39, being based upon an erroneous 
assumption, should be reversed and the credit reinstated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bryce E. Roe 
411 American Oil Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
16 
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